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ABSTRACT
Scholars often assume that Arab legislation including Egypt accommodates honor crimes.
Two pieces of Egyptian legislation that receive attention are Article 237 which reduce the
sanction to the husband who kills his adulterous wife upon committing adultery, and Article
17 which empowers courts in felonies to give leniency whenever they see appropriate. They
believe that Article 237 of the Egyptian penal code limits the reduction in sanctions to the
husbands while excluding other male paternal relatives. To accommodate this exclusion, they
assume that Article 17 of the penal code indirectly entrenches the scope of protection to cover
other male relatives and not only husbands. In their minds, this guarantees the perpetrators of
honor crimes lenient punishment constituting a safe escape from serious prosecution. An
examination of approximately 1,550 appeals submitted before the Egyptian Court of
Cassation from 1934 to 2014 that involve the application of Article 17 of the penal code
challenges these assumptions. It shows that the leniency of courts is not necessarily applied
every time a crime of honor is brought before them. The examination of the appeals
submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation assumes that honor crimes are not
necessarily the most common crimes to which the leniency of the judiciary is applied.
Leniency is assumed to be applied to other crimes including murders not involving honor,
illicit possession of drugs and weapons, bribery and several others. This research concludes
that leniency is assumed to be often given to a wide range of crimes including crimes
involving honor.
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I. Introduction
Honor crimes have been defined as longstanding and ancient practices in which male family
members kill women for bringing dishonor to the family.1 Women are presumed to disgrace
their families by carrying out sexual acts outside marriage. 2 Sometimes such crimes are
committed on the mere suspicion of women being engaged in sexual affairs beyond the scope
of legitimate marriage.
In Egypt, honor crimes are not spelled out within its legislation. In spite of this absence,
however, some scholars assume that Egypt fully accommodates honor crimes in the penal
code through both Article17, which empowers courts to give leniency to whatever felonies
they deem appropriate based on the circumstances at hand, and Article 237 which gives a
reduction in sanction to the husband who kills his adulterous wife.3 Scholars believe that
Article 17 of the penal code guarantees the perpetrators of honor crimes, who do not fall
under the scope of reduction in sanction embodied in Article 237 of the code, less serious
prosecutions. They propose that it is not only husbands who often benefit from a reduction
similar to the one stipulated in Article 237 of the penal code but male paternal relatives as
well. They see that Article 17 of the penal code indirectly entrenches the scope of protection
to cover other male relatives not only husbands.
This paper argues that such an assumption is challenged in light of the examination of the
appeals submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation involving the application of Article
17 of the penal code. The examination this thesis reveals to a considerable extent an
approximate image to the actual extent of the application of leniency by courts. In actuality,
the analysis suggested assumes that leniency of courts is applied in a broad manner often well
beyond the crimes of honor. Court leniency is extended to a wide range of additional crimes
including murder for reasons apart from honor, illicit possession of drugs, bribery and several
others. The leniency in Article 17 is not necessarily a complementary article to Article 237 of
the penal code which guarantees the perpetrators of honor of crimes less serious prosecution.
Leniency is also not necessarily applied every single time it is brought before the courts.
1

Yadav, Supriya, For the sake of honor: but whose honor? Honor crimes against women, 5 Asia-Pac. J. on
Hum. Rts. & L. 64-65 (2004).
2
John A. Cohan, Honor Killings And The Cultural Defense, 40 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 191 (2009-2010).
3
See Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: Honor Of The East And Passion Of The West, 1997 Utah L.
Rev. 290 (1997); Lama Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings And The Construction Of Gender In Arab Societies, 58 Am.
J. Comp. L. 928, 931 (2010); LYNN WELCHMAN & SARA HOSSAIN, 'HONOUR': CRIMES, PARADIGMS &
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 143-144 Chapter 6 (Zed Books 2005) (2008); Fatma Khafagy, Honour Killing in
Egypt,
8-9
(May
2005)
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vawgp2005/docs/experts/khafagy.honorcrimes.pdf.

The first chapter of this paper presents the definition, roots, and justification for honor killing,
with a focus on Egypt’s position on honor crimes. The second chapter analyzes the literature
on honor crimes in Egypt and the Middle East written in both Arabic and English. The third
chapter elucidates the concept of leniency adopted under Article 17 of the Egyptian penal
code, its scope of application and regulation. The authority of the court of cassation upon the
application of Article 17 of the penal code is also discussed. The final chapter analyzes the
appeals submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation relating to the application of
Article 17 of the penal code.
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Chapter I
II. Honor Crimes under Egyptian Legislation
A. The definition of honor crimes:
The longstanding and ancient practice of Honor crimes often takes place when male family
members kill women for bringing dishonor to the family.4 The latter have a burden not to
disgrace their families by carrying out sexual acts outside marriage. 5 These crimes may be
committed on the mere suspicion of women being engaged in sexual affairs beyond the scope
of legitimate marriage.
Having a closer look on the term honor under Arabic language, it is defined under few Arabic
wordings. These wordings generally pour in the same frame of the concept of honor. They
form altogether the concept of honor under Arabic language. The meaning of the word honor
meets the following Arabic terms ‘ird, sharaf and karama. The first refers to honor, good
repute and dignity, while the second refers to nobility, high rank, eminence, distinction, honor
and glory and finally the last means nobility, honor and respect.6
In Middle East, the concept of honor has been closely attached to the woman’s
virginity/chastity. Women living in the region of the Middle East are expected to preserve
their chastity. Such chastity can be represented in an unmarried women’s will to keep their
virginity till they reach the age of marriage. Chastity would last even after marriage as
women have to preserve the honor of their marriage. Chastity of women is meant to preserve
the honor of their families and husbands and that the former do not bring disgrace on their
families by departing from honor’s code of conduct, within a certain society. The honor code
may include the way women should be dressed, talk and live within the accepted norms set
by such society.
Women’s failure to stick to the code of honor may result into aggressive reactions emanating
from the male family members towards these women. The aggressiveness of such reactions
may mount to honor killings. Honor related killings exist whenever women are believed to be
disgracing their families. Women who cannot preserve their chastity are considered as failing

4

Yadav, Supra note 1, at 64-65.
Cohan, Supra note 2, at 191.
6
Beth Baron, Women, Honour and the State: Evidence from Egypt, 42 Midd. East. Studies J. 1 (2006).
5
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to preserve the honor of their families and would consequently face the severe consequences
to such failure.

B. Responsibility for honor:
Honor in many countries especially in the Middle East region has been considered as the
responsibility of husbands and other paternal relatives. Accordingly the perpetrators of most
of the crimes involving honor are male family members. The problem which most of the
literature available on honor crimes point out is that some Arab criminal codes provide for a
special treatment for male family members who perpetrate such type of crime. They propose
that such special treatment can be witnessed in the reduction in or even the exemption from
sanction granted by some of these criminal codes to the male family members who commit
crimes of honor.
The special treatment, which the literature available highlights, varies depending on the
ideology adopted within the legislation of different countries. They claim that most of the
Arab legislations provide for partial or total exemption from sanction to perpetrators of honor
killings. The exemption from sanction differs in terms of the scope of application, the kind of
act committed to which the exemption applies and who should benefit from such exemption.7
As for the scope of application, it varies by whether it grants a full exemption from
punishment or a reduction in sanction to the perpetrators of honor crimes. The Jordanian code
for instance, grant a full exemption from punishment to the husband who catches his wife
committing adultery,8 while in the same case the Egyptian would grant a partial exemption
from punishment to husbands and not a whole exemption as the former code does.9
As for the kind of act committed to which the exemption applies, it varies according to the act
itself. For example, the Egyptian code limits the acts to which such partial exemption applies
to the act of adultery while the Jordanian code expands the exemption to include situations
other than situation of adultery or equivocal attitudes.10 Accordingly, the exemption is
sometimes extended to include more situations than the situation of adultery.

7

Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 294.
Law No. 16 of 1960 (Criminal Code of 1960, reformed in 2011), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 1 Jan. 1960, Article
340 (Jordan)
9
Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-Waqi’a al-Misriyah 5 Aug. 1937, Article
237 (Egypt)
10
Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 294.
8
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While as for the ones who benefit from the exemption, the codes differ in terms of whom
they count as beneficiaries of the exemption. Under Egyptian code it is limited to the
husbands excluding all other paternal relatives, while under the Jordanian code the umbrella
is expanded to include all the female’s male family members , not only husbands so that it
encompasses whomever cannot marry the female caught in the sexual act for blood, nursing
and marriage reasons.

C. Roots of honor killings:
Examinations of the roots of honor crimes in the Middle East usually incorporate the
relationship between Islamic Sharia and honor related violence. The debate on the
relationship between Islamic Sharia and honor crimes is recognized but beyond the scope of
this paper. Nevertheless, it is notable that many acknowledge that honor crimes pre-date most
religions including Islam.11 Many propose that honor crimes roots are found in ancient
Bedouin and desert tribal traditions and mentalities.12
It is believed that honor killings existed among ancient tribal communities living in the desert
before the existence of modern religious.13 Such practice is assumed to exist before Quran. A
Muslim tribe leader once stated that "[m]en's honor comes before the Book”.14 The practice is
not based on Quran or any other Islamic teaching.15
Centuries ago, the custom of protection of honor by male members of the family evolved
within tribal communities in the desert.16 And it has been believed that the protection of
honor is a male duty to kill any female member who get engaged in an inappropriate sexual
act.17 The custom embodying the practice has developed and continued to exist even within
some of the modern pieces of legislation and different cultures.18 The adoption of such
practice can be also present even there stands a law which does not allow for such practice
11

See Johanna Bond, Honor As A Property, 23 Colum. J. Gender & L. 216 (2012); Catherine Warrick, The
Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law And Gender In Jordan, 39 Law & Soc'y Rev. 324 (2005); John A. Cohan,
Honor Killings And The Cultural Defense, 40 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 196 (2009-2010); Christina A. Maddek, Killing
Dishonor: Effective Eradication Of Honor Killing, 29 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 54 (2005-2006); Rachel A.
Ruane Ruane, Murder In The Name Of Honor: Violence Against Women In Jordan And Pakistan, 14 Emory Int'l
L. Rev. 1530 (2000).
12
Id.
13
Cohan, Supra note 2, at 196.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Christina A. Maddek, Killing Dishonor: Effective Eradication Of Honor Killing, 29 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev.
54 (2005-2006)
17
Id. at 54-55.
18
Rachel A. Ruane, Murder In The Name Of Honor: Violence Against Women In Jordan AndPakistan, 14
Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1549 (2000).
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within Arab tribal law, as administered by tribe leaders in the absence of a strong state to
enforce such prohibition.19
In modern history, some argue that Egypt, as well as other Arab countries, has borrowed what
serves the concept of honor from western legislation as the French laws.20 In this regard, one
main legal source most Arab countries relied on was the French Penal Code of 1810. 21 The
French code embodied articles which helped the concept of protection of honor by male
family members to exist. For instance, the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese penal codes
borrowed the terms female-ascendants and descendants from the French code, thus extending
the benefit to husbands, fathers, sons and brothers.22 The Egyptian, Tunisian and Kuwaiti
codes limited the benefit from such acts to the husbands.23
In light of the existence of penal codes as such, transgressors of the code of honor often face
violent reaction from the guardians of the code; male members of the family. 24 Violence may
be represented in beating, stabbing and in many instances killing the woman to regain the
honor of the family. Several communities believe that honor related crimes are tools to
remove the stains of dishonor where perpetrators of such crimes are believed by these
communities to be idols for preserving the honor of their families.25 Some believe that the
sole escape from honor disgrace is blood; they assume that blood cleanses honor.26
Honor killing still stands as a problematic issue in the Middle East. According to United
Nations for Population Activities, a report in the year 2000 states that 5,000 women and girls
were killed by the members of their families for the failure of preserving their chastity and
the honor of their families.27

D. Justification for honor killing:

19

Baron, Supra note 6, at 3.
See Catherine Warrick, The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law And Gender In Jordan, 39 Law & Soc'y Rev.
334 (2005); Melissa Spatz, A "Lesser" Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill Their
Wives, 24 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 601 (1991); Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: Honor Of The
East And Passion Of The West, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 295 (1997).
21
Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 295.
22
Id. at 294.
23
Id.
24
WELCHMAN, Supra note 3, at 42-63.
25
Yadav, Supra note 1, at 65.
26
Ruane, Supra note 18, at 1523.
27
UNFPA, Lives Together, Worlds Apart: Men and Women in a Time of Change, 5 (2000)
http://www.unfpa.org/publications/state-world-population-2000#sthash.ewRDmld1.dpuf.
20
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It is believed that most Arab legislation accommodates crimes involving honor. Such
accommodation may be in the form of exemption from or reduction in sanction for the
perpetrators of such crimes. The exemption or reduction in sanction for the perpetrators of
honor crimes is justified on various bases. One, is that the male family members are deemed
as the guardians of the family honor. Second, is the provocation state under which the male
member of the family gets influenced and perpetrate his crime.
The first justification stems from the roots of honor killing. It is assumed that the male
members of the family are the ones responsible for the preserving its honor. Women
themselves are also expected to carry the burden preserving their honor and the honor of their
families. The latter are expected to do so by sticking to the code of honor adopted within the
society they live in. It is believed that if women preserve their honor and do not surpass the
limits set by the societies they are living within, accordingly, they are preserving the honor of
their families. On the one hand man’s honor is crucially built on his ability to guard and
control his womenfolk’s behavior, especially their sexual behavior.28 While on the other
hand, women are expected not to disgrace or dishonor their family. 29 In Arab societies, men
are obliged to determine acceptable patterns of behavior for their women and the latter must
stick to the patterns set by the former.30 The basic elements of honor can be summed up in the
control over women behavior, threat to the honor of the family and the societal
involvement.31 In situations where a woman surpasses the limits accepted within the society
she lives in by engaging in inappropriate sexual acts or catching a bad reputation may face
serious troubles which may mount to getting killed in the name of honor by the guardians of
the family honor; male family members.
Another primary justification for honor crimes is believed to be provocation in situations of
adultery.32 A provoked male family member who kills his female relative for finding the
latter engaged in a wrongful sexual act may benefit from an exemption or reduction in
sanction.

28

DANIEL G. BATES & AMAL RASSAM, PEOPLES AND CULTURES OF THE MIDDLE EAST 211-239 (Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1983) (1983).
29
Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 916-19.
30
TAHIRE KOCTURK, A MATTER OF HONOUR: EXPERIENCES OF TURKISH WOMEN IMMIGRANTS 33-58 (London;
Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1992) (1992).
31
NANCY V. BAKER, ET AL, FAMILY KILLING FIELDS: HONOUR RATIONALES IN THE MURDER OF WOMEN,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 164-184 (February 1999) (1999).
32
Donna K. Coker, Heat Of Passion And Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. &
Women’s Stud. 80 (1992-93).
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On the one hand, jurists under English and American systems usually refer to adultery as the
ideal example of adequate provocation for honor killing.33 Sexual provocation upon the sight
of a wife’s adultery is recognized as an adequate provocation to decrease the severity of the
murder crime.34 Under many jurisdictions, sexual provocation is used as a cultural selfdefense.35 Abusive men’s primary excuse for their violence is being “out of control” induced
from the victim’s provocation which led them to lose control.36
Provocation is considered justifiable within certain limits. Such limits differ according to the
competent legal system. Under common law, the four elements which govern voluntary
manslaughter doctrine are:
a. A provocation reached by a reasonable man to the heat of passion,
b. The provocation is a result of heat of passion,
c. There was no time for a reasonable man to cool off,
d.

The perpetrator did not cool off till the time he committed his crime. 37

Common law jurisdictions adopt the concept of provocation as long as it falls within the
category of adequate provocation. The construction of such adequacy, often named as
common law categories of adequate provocation, are specific and can be framed in the
presence of serious battery, aggravated assault, the commission of the crime against a close
relative and the witnessing of the wife committing adultery by a husband.38
The main question in regards to crimes of honor committed under the American system rests
in whether the perpetrator was provoked by the deceased and that he acted rashly and under
the spell of hot blood and passion leading him to act without judgment. The answer to that
question lies in whether the criteria of adequacy are met or not. Accordingly the questions
would be formulated as whether the provocation was adequate to create the heat of passion,
whether there was enough time for the accused to cool off and whether the accused

33

Id., at 72.
Id.
35
See John A. Cohan, Honor Killings And The Cultural Defense, 40 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 196 (2009-2010);
Christina A. Maddek, Killing Dishonor: Effective Eradication Of Honor Killing, 29 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev.
64 (2005-2006).
36
Coker, Supra note 32, at 75.
37
Coker, Supra note 32, at 79 (1992-93), Dolores A. Donovan, Stephanie M. Wildman, Is The Resonable Man
Obsolete? A Critical Perspective On Selfdefense And Provocation, 14 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 448 (1980-1981).
38
Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 296.
34
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committed his crime as a result of the heat of passion produced on seeing the deceased
committing adultery.39 Under all scenarios such adequacy is left to the courts to determine.40
On the other hand, Arab legislations also recognize the provocation as a justification for
honor crimes. They, however, differ in the expansion of the concept of provocation in terms
of who should benefit from acting under such concept. In general, Arab legislation tends to
adopt the concept of honor rather than passion.41 Their codes are more accommodating in
extending the concept of provocation to the perpetrators of honor crimes. They extend the
concept to include the paternal relatives not only to the husband but also the father, brother
and son.
Abu-Odeh portrays the status of Arab legislation towards honor crimes.42 She elucidates that
Arab legislations differ in this regard on two main issues. The first issue rests on limiting the
defense of provocation to incidents of adultery and providing a reduction and not an
exemption in penalty. This can be best exemplified under the Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan and
Kuwaiti penal codes.43 While other codes expand provocation to wider range of incidents
which includes unlawful bed that stretches to include all other sexual practices short to
adultery like under the Jordanian penal code.
The second Arab legislation issue relates to who should benefit from the justification of
honor crimes. Since Syrian and Lebanese penal codes have adopted French terminology
female ascendants and descendants; accordingly the ones who benefit from the justification
are the fathers, brothers and sons of the deceased.44 The Jordanian penal code even extends
the scope of application of the excuse to include other sexual acts short to adultery.45
Article 340 of the Jordanian code portrays the construction of such an extended application.
The article stipulates the following:
He who catches his wife, or one of his (female) un-lawfuls committing
adultery with another, and he kills, wounds, or injures one or both of
them, is exempt from any penalty. He who catches his wife, or one of
his (female) ascendants, descendants or sisters with another in an
39

M. D. G., Manslaughter And The Adequacy Of Provocation: The Reasonablness Of The Reasonable Man, 106
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1022 (1957-1958).
40
Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 296.
41
See Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 287-307.
42
Id., at 911-52.
43
Id., at 915.
44
Id.
45
Female unlawful is a male who cannot marry the woman for blood, nursing or marriage in law reasons.
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unlawful bed, and he kills or wounds or injures one or both of them,
benefits from a reduction of penalty.
Article 340 of the Jordanian penal code grants the provoked husband who catches his wife
committing adultery a full exemption from penalty. It also provides for a reduction in penalty
for those who injure, wound or kill their female ascendants and descendants for being in
unlawful bed with another. The Jordanian code is clearly more accommodating towards
honor rather than passion.46
Dishonoring under Jordanian penal code is a collective injury to the father, brother, son and
any other male relative. It is not individualistic in being limited only to males who could be
sexually connected to the female, primarily husbands.47 The idea of collectivism of honor
also applies to both Syrian and Lebanese penal codes since they adopt the same concept of
female ascendants and descendants.48
A contrary scenario to the extension of excuse, as under the Jordanian, is found in the
Algerian penal code. The Algerian penal code provides for both the husband and the wife to
benefit from a reduction in sanction if s/he who catches her/his partner committing adultery.49
By granting – equally - both husband and wife the right to benefit from such reduction in
penalty reflects the fact that the Algerian code is more accommodating to the concept of
passion rather than the concept of honor while most of the other Arab codes excludes female
family members from the beneficiaries.

E. Where Egypt stands from honor killings:
In Egypt, honor killings are regulated in the penal code under the section of indecent assaults
and corruption of morals. The Egyptian penal code does not recognize provocation in
criminal matters unless in situations of adultery. However, Article 237 of the Egyptian penal
code stipulates that a husband who kills his wife in situation of adultery benefits from a
reduction in sanction. The justification behind such reduction in sanction is that the husband
gets provoked by the sight of his wife in bed with another man thus he kills his wife and

46

Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 296.
Id., at 293.
48
Id., at 294.
49
Law No. 66 of 1966 (Criminal Code of 1966, reformed in 2006), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 8 Jun. 1966, Article
279 (Algeria)
47
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partner in adultery.50 The reduction in sanction it provides for is to the husband who kills his
wife by surprise upon catching them committing adultery.51
Article 237 of Egyptian penal code grants a reduction of penalty for the provoked husband
who kills his wife on the spot catching her red-handed committing adultery.52 The article
stipulates that a husband who catches his wife committing the crime of adultery with another
and kills her or her partner immediately shall be punished with imprisonment instead of the
sanctions stipulated in articles 234 and 236.53 This means that the husband who kills his wife
under such a condition, instead of being tried as a perpetrator of a felony is charged with a
misdemeanor.
Unlike the Algerian penal code, the Egyptian penal code does not grant such a right to both
husbands and wives. Under the latter women are not entitled to a reduction in sanction.
Accordingly, if a woman surprises her husband while committing adultery with another and
she kills him, she is punished for intentional killing under article 234 – a felony – as the
reduction in sanction is exclusively stipulated as being for men alone.
The Egyptian legislator sets down three conditions for the provoked husband to benefit from
the reduction in penalty stipulated under article 237 of the Egyptian penal code. In regards to
the adultery of the wife, the conditions set for the proper application of the article are almost
similar to the conditions set for the adequate provocation under the American system. 54 The
conditions stipulated are the following:
1. The identity of the perpetrator
2. Provocation upon surprise
3. The immediate killing 55

50

AHMED F. SROUR, PRIVATE SECTION-PENAL CODE, CRIMES PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OF INDIVIDUALS – FUNDS CRIMES, 734 (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiyya 2013) (2013).
51

PUBLIC INTEREST – CRIMES

Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-Waqi’a al-Misriyah 5 Aug. 1937, Article
237 (Egypt)
52
Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-Waqi’a al-Misriyah 5 Aug. 1937, Article
237 (Egypt).
53
The legislator in the case of a husband who surprises his wife committing adultery and kills her on the spot
with her partner benefits from a reduction in sanction and should not be punished neither with the sanctions
stipulated for the intentional killing without persistence or premeditation stipulated under article 234, nor with
the sanctions stipulated under article 236 for the crime of beating leading to death. Accordingly the husband in
that case would be facing a punishment of imprisonment of three years maximum.
54
Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 288.
55
SROUR, Supra note 50, at 732-35.
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As for the first condition, the perpetrator has to be the husband of the female who was caught
red-handed committing adultery. Only he is entitled to such a reduction in penalty, and not
any other paternal relative.56 He has to be the lawful husband according to the Egyptian code
of personal status matters.
The second condition requires that the provoked husband, in order to be protected by article
237, surprises his wife immediately on committing adultery.57 A husband should be provoked
by virtue of surprise in seeing his wife committing the crime of adultery, thus raising the heat
of passion leading to the rash killing of her or her partner.
The last condition is related to the absence of a cooling off period where the husband kills his
wife on the spot upon being surprised by seeing her committing adultery with another. No
cooling-off period may intervene between the husband’s shock at seeing his wife committing
adultery and the actual act of killing if it does, the husband is deprived of such protection.58
The legal effect of such reduction is that if the three conditions are met the nature of the
crime changes from being a felony to being a misdemeanor. The husband who kills his wife
would be sentenced to three years of imprisonment instead of facing capital punishment or to
a labor punishment of twenty five years. Added to that, since the reduction in sanction applies
to an act of murder then it also extends to the less violent acts. The reduction extends to cases
other than killing such as when the husband attempts to murder his wife but he fails leaving
her with permanent disability. In a felony lessened to a misdemeanor sanctioned by
imprisonment,59 thus the competent court is the first instance court – the court competent for
hearing cases of misdemeanors – to decide the case.60
In general, Arab legislation lies between two poles; the first is represented by the Algerian
code while the Jordanian code represents the other. The former, by granting spouses the same
right to reduction in penalty, is a clear reflection of the concept of passion, while the latter by
granting exemption from penalty to men who catch their wives committing adultery, and
reduction in penalty of men who catch their female family members in bed with another
committing adultery responds to the concept of honor.61

56

Id. at 733; see also HESHAM A. AL-JEMEELY, EXPLANATION OF PENAL CODE, 449 (2013).
Id. at 733-34.
58
Id. at 734.
59
Id. at 735.
60
AL-JEMEELY, Supra note 56, at 453.
61
Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 915-16 (2010); see also Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 295.
57

12

Egypt’s positive position regarding honor crimes is be midway between the two poles. The
Egyptian penal code under Article 237 provides for a reduction in sanction as an exclusive
excuse for the husband and not the wife. Both Egyptian and Algerian codes exclude males
who cannot be sexually connected to females via the extension of application of reduction in
punishment.62
Although Egypt limits the reduction in sanction stipulated under Article 247 of the penal code
to the husband, nevertheless, most of the literature available on honor crimes in Egypt assume
that Egyptian judiciary extends the same benefit stipulated for the husband under the penal
code. They claim that Egyptian judiciary circumvents the limitation stipulated under Article
237 of the penal code and extend the same treatment to paternal relatives other than the
husband by applying Article 17 of the Egyptian penal codes to the perpetrators of honor
crimes.
Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code entitles judges, in felonies, to use their leniency on
crimes wherever they see necessary.63 Leniency of judiciary rests in their discretionary power
to reduce punishment whenever necessary according to the circumstances of the crime or the
act committed. A judge may replace the sanction of capital punishment by the penalty of life
hard labor, permanent hard labor penalty by temporary hard labor or imprisonment,
temporary hard labor with imprisonment or confinement not less than six months and finally
an imprisonment sentence may be replaced with a confinement penalty of not less than three
months.

F. Leniency under Egyptian Penal Code:
It is believed that the Egyptian penal code limits the reduction in sanction under Article 237
of the penal code to husbands and excludes other paternal relatives. Nevertheless, the
literature available on honor crimes in Egypt argues that Egyptian judiciary implicitly tends
to recognize crimes of honor.
Legal scholars assume that crimes of honor are compromised through the use of Article 17 of
the penal code by judges.64 Some contend that Article 17 of the penal code is frequently used
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by judges in cases where crimes of honor are involved.65 Judges are believed to be sending an
implicit message that they will not tolerate illegitimate sexual practices by finding an escape
through the leniency entitled to them.66 They note the fact that judges can apply Article 17 of
the penal code based on their sole discretion. They believe that judges in Egypt resort to
available alternative concepts such as the concept of leniency to provide the male family
members who commit honor crimes an escape from punishment.67
Some believe that courts under the concept of leniency secure successful prosecution for
difficult cases involving crimes of honor.68 They note that judges, who are males, are
sympathetic towards the honor which has been injured by the illicit act of females while
being unsympathetic to ‘loose’ women.69 They believe that the presence of such measures
represented in provisions stipulating the exemption or reduction of sanctions violate
international laws and norms and must be abolished. The codes should be globally consistent
with international instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women,70 which preserve the rights of women.71
On the one hand, it is evident that the literature review available regarding crimes of honor in
Egypt propose that Article 17 of the penal code is used by the Egyptian judiciary as a
complementary article with Article 237 of the penal code. They contend that former article
entitles judges to apply leniency to the male family members other than the husband who
commit honor crimes. Accordingly, although the reduction under the latter article is limited
to the husband, nevertheless, the former article if applied by the judiciary leads to a lenient
sanction to the male family members who commit honor crimes and even for husbands who
fail to get tried under the latter Article. While on the other hand, the literature available fails
to provide for a considerable case analysis, however instead, they provide for very few case
analysis involving honor crimes to which Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code is applied to.
***
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Chapter II
III.

The Common Assumption on Leniency granted to Egyptian
Courts:

Some scholars and law practitioners believe that the Egyptian Penal code is one of the codes
that provides a secure escape from prosecution for the perpetrators of honor crimes. They
propose that although the honor crimes are not spelled out under Egyptian penal code,
nonetheless, Article 17 of the penal code is often used a complementary article with Article
237 of the same code.72 They argue that the latter Article provides a favorable treatment to
husbands who kill their adulterous wives when catching them in the act of adultery.
Moreover, they assume that the former article indirectly entrenches the scope of protection to
cover other male relatives not only husbands although the reduction in sanction is only
limited to husbands under the former Article.
To a large extent these scholars and law practitioners who believe that Article 17 provide a
secure escape from prosecution to the perpetrators of honor crimes who do not fall under
Article 237 have a good point to make. Most of the literature available on honor crimes in
Egypt base their assumption on judgments rendered in cases involving honor crimes where
first or second instance courts give leniency to the perpetrators whether husbands or other
male relatives like fathers, brothers or sons. However, I argue that none of these judgements
provides a considerable analysis of judgments rendered from these courts which reflect a
comprehensive image on the use of leniency by judges granted to them by virtue of the law.
In light of the absence of such analysis, I believe that the assumptions they adopt is not based
on concrete evidence that courts are always lenient towards the perpetrators of such types of
crimes. The evidence which this literature often rely on is the narration of few judgments on
cases of honor crimes to which the leniency of judges is applied while they disregard the
cases to which leniency is not applied. It is because of this the literature available on honor
crimes in Egypt should be carefully examined.
This chapter provides for an analysis of the literature available on honor crimes in Egypt and
the Middle East written in both Arabic and English. The first section of this chapter
elucidates the ideology of both sets of literature in regards to honor crimes, while the second
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section of the chapter analyzes the subtext of the available literature with an examination of
what underlies both.

A. English literature on honor crimes:
The bulk of the literature available written in English on the issue of honor crimes in Egypt
can be divided into firstly, literature which generally embodies an explanation for the
favorable treatment granted to the perpetrators of honor crimes under Arab Penal codes with
a reference to Egyptian code.73 Secondly, literature with a focus on the application of Article
17 of the penal code without narration of cases involving honor crimes or analysis of those
types of cases.74 Thirdly, literature with a focus on the extension of leniency by courts to the
perpetrators of honor crimes with a brief presentation of these cases as evidence of the
existence of such lenient treatment towards offenders of honor crimes.75
The first group of literature presents the issue of favorable/special treatment of offenders of
honor crimes granted generally by most of the Arab codes. This group believes that the laws
of Arab countries, including Egypt, embody discriminatory legal provisions within their
national legislatures. They generally refer to the discrimination found within the codes of
these countries. Such discrimination rests in the legal provisions which provide for more
favorable treatment of male-perpetrators of honor crimes. They believe that the latter enjoy
biased prosecutions before courts. These legal provisions range from reduction to elimination
of sanctions depending on each system. These scholars contend that the existence of this type
of provision constitutes a violation of women’s rights as they grant the male-perpetrators of
honor crimes a guaranteed escape from harsh sanctions to reduced or eliminated sanctions,
thus helping honor crimes to continue to survive.
Some literature further stress on the fact that the presence of such provisions within many of
these Arab codes, including Egypt, supports the contention that women are dealt with as male
properties:
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[T]he law in many countries has implicitly treated honor as a form of
property and has made legal and social allowances for men who seek
to reclaim honor property through violence.76
Being property, women are expected to preserve the honor code and ethics of the family
within the society they live. Men are the ones responsible for monitoring and controlling
women’s behavior within the society. Furthermore, they argue that some countries
accommodate a comprehensible understanding of honor related crimes by reducing penalties
for the perpetrators of honor crimes:
Because the value of honor property fluctuates based on women's
behavior, other family members, often males, seek to aggressively
monitor and control the behavior of the women in the family. In its
most extreme form, control over women's behavior manifests in
honor-related violence, including murder. In some countries, the law
perpetuates this implicit understanding of honor as property by
reducing penalties for those who commit crimes in an effort to reclaim
honor.77
Others emphasize on the fact that penal codes in Egypt as well as in many Arab countries
encompass codes which provide for reduction in sanction for the perpetrators of honor
killings:
The Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese penal codes provide
reductions or elimination of penalty for murders committed for
reasons of honor. The statutes generally specify that the victim is
female, that the perpetrator is a male relative of a certain degree
(usually brother, father, or husband), and the circumstances of the
victim's behavior that justify the crime (catching a wife in the act of
adultery, for example).78
They claim that countries which designed laws as such try to balance between claims of
cultural authenticity and claims to maintain democracy and human rights through preserving
law. “One arm of the state seeks to preserve the law for the former purpose, while another
seeks to change it for the latter.”79 They propose that these laws should depart from applying
these provisions as they favor the wrong individuals; the perpetrators of honor crimes. 80 They
believe that these laws should be amended in order to embody more appropriate penalties
which are consistent with the magnitude of the acts of honor killings.
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Some further propose that these discriminative legal provisions serve as a safe escape for the
perpetrators of honor crimes from fair prosecution carrying harsh penalties. They argue that
these laws, in some instances, provide for full exemption of the perpetrators from such types
of crimes.81 “Some countries have given these values the force of law by acquitting men who
kill female relatives who have violated the family honor … In extreme cases, men who
murder adulterous wives receive no punishment at all”.82 They believe that domestic laws as
such should be amended to embody sanctions which proportionate to the gravity of the
crimes of the honor crime committed.83
Furthermore, some urge these countries to abolish laws which provide for the reduction or
abolition of sanctions to be consistent with the international norms and conventions signed
and ratified by most of these countries.84 They regard these laws as impeding upon the
consistency of domestic laws with international conventions.
The second group of scholars present a closer examination of the nature of the legal
provisions embodied within Egyptian legislation as well as other Arab systems. For instance,
they focus on the application of Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code and similar articles
under other Arab legislative systems while the first group does not mention Article 17 per se.
It generally shares the assumption regarding the favorable treatment granted to the
perpetrators of honor crimes. The second group of scholars mainly focuses on how Egyptian
competent courts, sometimes resort to the use of Article 17 as an alternative under the
Egyptian penal code.
This group refers to the favorable treatment the offenders of honor crimes – male perpetrators
– receive on prosecution. The group claims that such favorable treatment is divided into two
major distinctions in the way in which these codes regulate honor crimes. The first codes
limit honor crimes to situations of adultery and provide for a reduction in sanction and not an
exemption from sanction:
[S]ome Codes (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Kuwait) limit the defense
to situations of adultery, and they provide for a reduction of, not
exemption from, punishment. Other Codes expand the defense to
situations of the "un-lawful bed" (Jordan) or "attitude equivoque"
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(Syria, Lebanon) which receive a reduced sentence, while limiting the
excuse of exemption to cases of adultery.85
Other codes may vary in terms of who benefits from such reduction or elimination of
sanction.86 Codes may expand the range of the beneficiaries of the excuse to include, not only
the husbands but also, female unlawful males – ones who cannot marry women for nursing,
blood or marriage reasons:
The Syrian and Lebanese Codes adopt the French terminology (wife,
female ascendants, descendants and sister) so that the husband, the
son, the father and the brother benefit. The Jordanian Code grants
these relatives a reduced sentence in the case of the unlawful bed,
while providing exemption for a bigger list of beneficiaries through its
use of the Ottoman expression, wife or female un-lawfuls in the case
of "committing adultery.87
As noted Egypt falls within the range of the first distinction along with the codes of Libya,
Kuwait and Tunisia provide favorable treatment to offenders of honor crimes for reasons of
adultery. They do so by providing for a reduction in sanction and not an elimination of
sanction.
Other codes like the Jordanian penal code provide full elimination of the sanction for
husbands who kill their wives for committing adultery. Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal
Code provides for the following: “He who catches his wife, or one of his female un-lawfuls
committing adultery with another, and he kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them, is
excused and benefits from an exemption from penalty.” 88
The second distinction relates to who benefits from the reduction or the elimination of the
sanction. The Egyptian code limits the benefit from its reduction in sanction to the husband
while no other male relatives can benefit from such a reduction. Only husbands who kill,
wound or injure their wives committing adultery benefit from a reduction in sanction.89
According to the Egyptian penal code, husbands who kill their wives on the spot while
committing adultery are sanctioned for committing a misdemeanor and not a felony. Article
237 of the Egyptian Penal Code stipulates the following:
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“Whoever surprises his wife in the act of adultery and kills her on the spot together with her
adulterer-partner shall be punished with prison [habs] instead of the penalties prescribed in
Articles 234 and 236.”
Under the Jordanian code the beneficiaries from the elimination of sanction extends beyond
the husband to include all female-unlawful males as paternal male relatives, even the
female’s brother in law may benefit from the elimination of sanction if the conditions
stipulated within the law are met: “He who catches his wife, or one of his female ascendants
or descendants or sisters with another in an un-lawful bed, and he kills or wounds or injures
one or both of them, benefits from a reduction of penalty.” 90
Arab codes either explicitly stipulate a reduction or elimination of sanction for the
perpetrators of such crimes, or embrace special legal provisions which empowers judges to
extend the use of their leniency to perpetrators of such type crimes.91 The Egyptian penal
code under Article 237, though, limits explicitly the reduction in sanction to husbands killing
their wives committing adultery. This group contends that the Egyptian judiciary often resorts
to other available legal provisions in order to extend the application of their leniency to other
males other than the husband.
A remarkable effort to highlight is in this creative use of the law by Lama Abu-Odeh’s
work.92 Generally, Lama Abu-Odeh proposes that the Arab judiciary usually resort to
alternative available concepts circumventing, in instances like honor crimes, the will of the
legislator. 93 More specifically, she states that judiciaries adopting such codes usually resort to
the application of alternative concepts to ensure the extension of the beneficiaries of the
excuse. Such alternative concepts are represented in the application of leniency granted to the
judiciary by virtue of law to which they commonly resort upon examining cases involving
honor crimes. She gives for the Jordanian and the Egyptian judiciary as examples. In Jordan
this can be seen in Article 98 of the penal code which stipulates the following: “He who
commits a crime in a fit of fury caused by an un-rightful and dangerous act on the part of the
victim, benefits from a reduction of penalty.”94
She and several others especially among the third group note that leniency endowed to the
judiciary by Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code stand as the alternative available concept
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by which judiciary applies leniency at their own discretion to a massive number of felonies in
general and to a wide range of male perpetrators of honor crimes. Article 17 of the penal code
stipulates that:
In felony counts [Jinayat], if the conditions of the crime for which the
popular action is brought necessitate the judge's lenity, the penalty
may be changed as follows:
Capital punishment penalty may be replaced by a life hard labor or
temporary hard labor penalty.
A permanent hard labor penalty may be replaced by a temporary hard
labor penalty or by imprisonment.
A temporary hard labor penalty may be replaced by imprisonment or
confinement penalty that may not be less than six months.
An imprisonment sentence may be replaced by confinement penalty
which may not be less than three months.95
They argue that the reduction in sanction under Article 237 of the penal code is limited to the
husband. However, nothing impairs the discretionary power of courts examining the subject
matter to exercise leniency entitled to them by virtue of Article 17 of the penal code to other
paternal male relatives like fathers, brothers and sons. Abu-Odeh contends that the
application of leniency rests at the sole discretion of the Egyptian judiciary, forming a sort of
extension to the protection male perpetrators of such type of crimes generally enjoy.96
She notes that the Arab legislation ranges between two ends: honor crimes on the one end and
passion crimes on the other. She believes that since Egypt limits the reduction in sanctions
stipulated under Article 237 to husbands, it should be close to the passion crimes end.
However, in light of the discretionary power the Egyptian judiciary enjoys in applying
leniency to felonies, other male relatives other than the husband may be granted a reduction
in sanction thus placing Egypt midway between the two ends of passion and honor.97
This group of scholars stress that in light of Article 17 not only paternal male relatives who
commit such type of crimes benefit from a sanction reduction but also husbands who fail to
meet the conditions set forth under Article 237 of the penal code. For instance, Abu-Odeh
believes that the use by judges of this article for crimes of honor serves as a message to
society. She states that judges by applying this article to offenders involved in such type of
crimes implicitly reintroduce a message to society that some sexual practices are not tolerated
by courts.98 She contends that judges are often lenient to the perpetrators of such type of
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crimes as they do not accept the existence of illegitimate sexual affairs among the
surrounding society. And she refers to the high stakes a society bears in light of the existence
of such articles within Arab legislation:99 “The judges consciously [reject] the reinstitution of
traditional society but they [send] cultural messages that subversive sexual practices [are] not
to be tolerated.”100
This group of scholars who gives no detailed narration or analysis to cases to which Article
17 has been applied. Abu-Odeh acknowledges that it would always be hard to test the
tendency of Egyptian judiciary in regards to the application of leniency as the rulings of
lower courts remain unpublished.101 She believes that a case analysis would be hard to build
in light of such difficulty.
The third group also refer to the application of courts to Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code
as the second group of scholars do. However, they go a bit further as they provide a few cases
where courts applied Article 17 to the perpetrators of honor crimes. It refers to such cases as
evidence of the use by courts of leniency towards male offenders committing this type of
crime. Such literature is limited.102 The authors in this group claim that courts apply leniency
endowed to them by virtue of Article 17 of the penal code to the perpetrators of this crime
with no higher supervision from higher courts such as the court of cassation:
The issue of extenuating circumstances is one that is left totally to the
discretion of the court of fact, and it is up to this court to take it into
account for the beneﬁt of the accused even if he didn’t plead for it …
and the Court of Cassation has no jurisdiction over the matter so that
an appeal for considering the extenuating circumstances cannot be a
cause for action before the Court of Cassation.103
They argue that the courts of first or second instance tend to use the discretionary power
endowed to them by virtue of Article 17 in applying leniency to the paternal relatives accused
of committing honor crimes. They argue that Article 17 with its wide range of discretionary
power granted to the competent courts provide the perpetrators of such types of crimes
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lenient treatment which they believe that it should not be imposed upon the perpetrators of
these crimes.
This group believes that though honor crimes are not spelled out explicitly in the Egyptian
penal code, however, they claim that courts commonly use Article 17 to waive or reduce
sanctions against male offenders who commit crimes involving honor:104 “[honor] killings
that cannot be accommodated within the strict sphere of application of Article 237 are being
relegated to the discretion of the lower courts of fact as cases requiring the sympathy of the
judge under Article 17”.105
The reduction in sanction under Article 237 is limited to husbands and no other male
relatives. And Article 17 grants wide discretionary power to the competent courts to apply
leniency on the perpetrators of felonies. Thus, they consider Article 17 of the code as it stands
as forming a sort of protection to other paternal relatives like fathers, brothers or sons who
perpetrate an honor crime.
The supporters of this opinion believe that the Egyptian penal code is gender biased.106 They
claim that according to the cases they have examined, it is obvious that courts are biased
towards male perpetrators. They believe that the Egyptian penal code includes gender biased
articles which favor male perpetrators of such crimes. One in particular, is Article 17 of the
Egyptian penal code which, at the will of judges, extends favorable treatment to male
offenders who commit honor crimes and allow them to benefit from a reduction in sanction
almost on the same footing as the husbands do under Article 237.
This group argues that some of that judges of legal systems embracing reductions or
elimination of sanctions believe that perpetrators of honor crimes are not criminals in the eye
of the judiciary.107 They believe that offenders of honor crimes were socially compelled to
commit their crimes. They claim that judges always take into consideration the pressure that
society exerts upon the perpetrators of such type of crimes. Honor killings within the
societies embracing articles providing reduction and exemption from sanctions are believed
to serve as a means of cleansing for the stained honor. Males, as the guardians of the family’s
honor, must make sure that female family members are abiding by the code of honor adopted
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within the society. Reducing or elimination sanctions allows a re-establishment of the
wronged family’s honor.

B. Arabic literature written on honor crimes:
The published Egyptian literature written in Arabic discussing the issue of implementation of
article 17 to crimes involving honor and to the perpetrators of such type of crimes is rare to
find. Of that which exists, the literature can be divided into three main groups. The first group
generally elucidates the legal provisions of the Egyptian penal code. They make no
connection between honor crimes and the leniency endowed to the judiciary under Article 17
of the penal code.108 The second group also explains legal provisions of the Egyptian penal
code. It differs from the first group in that it further refers, within the general context, to the
possibility of the judiciary applying leniency to the perpetrators of honor crimes where they
seem appropriate.109 The last group goes further than the other two groups by expressing their
own views on the rationale behind the limitation of reduction of penalty to the husband
stipulated under Article 237 of the penal code.110
The first group explains the legal provisions of the penal code, presenting all the rationale
behind each article. For instance they elucidate the limitation stipulated under Article 237 of
the penal code to the husband rather than any male relative. This group also explains the
conditions and limitations of the implementation of Article 17 of the penal code which is
examined closely in the upcoming chapter. They do not state any personal views regarding
these two legal provisions.
As for the second group of scholars, it goes one step further than the first group. It refers to
the fact that the judiciary may resort, under some instances, to the application of Article 17 of
the penal code to some of the honor crimes.
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The last group includes the views of some Egyptian legal scholars from Cairo University.111
They explicitly state that limiting the application of Article 237 of the Egyptian Penal Code
to men rather than women and the deprivation of the latter from the reduction stipulated
under Article 237 of the penal code should be considered as fair discrimination.112 They see
that although the adultery of the husband is equal to the adultery of the wife from the moral
perspective, the adultery of the latter is deemed more dangerous than the former’s from the
social perspective as it may lead to more serious consequences than the adultery of the
husband like the confusion of lineages.113 While others relate such discrimination to the
assumption that the wife, being the nucleus of the family,114 should be the guardian of her
husband’s honor “Ird” and such crime would not take place unless the wife completely
surrenders her husband and children to her accomplice in adultery. 115 They believe that the
female members involved in adultery situations results in social immorality.

C. Alternative analysis:
Unlike the literature available in English on honor crimes, most of the Egyptian literature
written in Arabic does not recognize the existence of Articles 17 and 237 of the penal code as
being problematic. This is based on the following reasons. First, in regards to Article 237 of
the penal code, they believe that a husband who kills his wife immediately upon surprising
her committing adultery is not a dangerous person in the first place. They believe that a
husband who commit this act – killing the wife – is result of provocation.116 They see the
perpetrator, in such instance, as not reflecting a high level of criminality. Second, in regards
to the implementation of Article 17 of the penal code, they often see that this assumption is
originally based on the inherent right of the judiciary. It sees appropriate for any felony to
resort to the application of general provisions stipulated in the penal code and Article 17 of
the penal code stands as such.117
The literature written in English on honor crimes shares a general assumption that the
presence of legal provisions embodied generally within Arab legislation and specifically
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within the Egyptian legislation as Articles 17 and 237 of the Egyptian penal code clearly
provide for the safe prosecutions of the perpetrators of honor crimes.
They claim that judges by virtue of the power endowed to them under Article 17 circumvent
the will of the legislator stipulated under Article 237 of the penal code. The legislator, in the
latter article, has limited the reduction of sanctions to husbands killing their wives for
committing adultery. It is believed that judges usually use the former article, as an alternative
concept available under the same code, to entrench the scope of the favorable treatment to
other male relatives. Furthermore, judges may, on their own, give leniency to husbands who
fail to meet the conditions stipulated under the Article 237 of the penal code. They argue that
such discretionary power constitutes a major obstacle towards the erosion of honor crimes in
Egypt. They claim that Article 17 of the penal code acts as a complementary article to Article
237 of the penal code. With the wide discretionary power it puts at the sole discretion of the
judges, it enables the latter to give leniency wherever they deem necessary. They claim that
judges favor honor crime perpetrators as they widely give leniency to honor crimes. In
looking at the published literature in both Arabic and English, I believe that none of the
literature available on honor crimes critically analyzes actual rulings on cases involving
honor crimes which may stand as concrete evidence of their claim. The published literature
found citing cases involving honor crimes are very few. Moreover, they did not analyze wide
range of cases out of which one may assume the tendency of the judges, in regards of giving
leniency to perpetrators of honor crimes.
The English literature can be divided into two main streams; the first believes that it is hard to
provide for a proper honor crimes case analysis, especially in light of the non-availability of
court rulings due to the non-publication of these rulings. While the second often disregard
that problem and directly assume that the leniency of judges always provides a secure escape
for the perpetrators of honor crimes under Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code. Both
streams carry the same assumption: that the discretionary power awarded to judges is
wrongfully used in favor of perpetrators of honor crimes, whether for husbands who fail to
fall under the application of Article 237 of the Egyptian penal code or for the paternal
relatives who often perpetrate honor crimes for the sake of preserving honor.
I, nevertheless, argue that there exists an alternative type of analysis which the available
literature fails to provide. Such analysis presupposes an alternative view of the application of
leniency by courts in honor related crimes. An analysis of the appeals reviewed and
submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation relating to the application of Article 17 of
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the penal code out of which one may assume whether does the judiciary adopt a specific
tendency of giving leniency to the perpetrators of honor crimes or not.
Such analysis illuminates the practice of judges in relation to the application of leniency. It
reflects to a considerable extent how in practice judges apply their leniency in terms of what
type of crimes leniency is most often employed, what type of perpetrators benefit the most
from the leniency, and whether judges do, in fact, give leniency to the perpetrators of honor
crimes or not.
Before presenting the analysis, the next chapter provides a brief background on the
conditions, regulations and the scope of application of Article 17 as stipulated in the Egyptian
penal code. Furthermore, an explanation of the authority of the Egyptian Court of Cassation
over the use of leniency by lower courts is explained for the sake of the later analysis.

***
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Chapter III
IV.

The Concept of Leniency under Egyptian Penal Code: definition,
regulation and scope of application

Scholars argue that from the power endowed to them by virtue of Article 17 of the penal code
they often lean towards giving leniency to the perpetrators of honor crimes. Thus they
descend with the penalty stipulated for murder to less harsh penalties. For the sake of the
counter argument this paper provides for an explanation of the nature of the discretionary
power stipulated in the Egyptian penal code has to be elucidated. The legislator is the one
responsible for setting the conditions, regulations and the scope of application of legal
provisions as stipulated under any legal corpus. This chapter provides a brief explanation of
the classification of crimes under the Egyptian penal code. Furthermore, it elucidates the
concept of leniency adopted under Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code, its scope of
application and regulation. And finally the authority of the court of cassation upon the
application of Article 17 of the penal code is discussed.

A. Classification of crimes under Egyptian penal code:
Crimes are classified as per Article 9 of the Egyptian penal code into three types: felonies,
misdemeanors and contraventions. The classification of crimes is based on the harshness of
punishment according to the magnitude of the act committed. Accordingly, felonies are
crimes punished by life execution, life imprisonment, aggravated imprisonment and
imprisonment.118 And misdemeanors are crimes punished by detention of no less than twenty
four hours and no more than three years and/or fines exceeding one hundred Egyptian
pounds.119 Contraventions are acts punished by fines less than one hundred Egyptian
pounds.120

B. The nature of leniency granted to the Egyptian judiciary:
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The Egyptian penal code recognizes the concept of leniency in criminal matters. Article 17 of
the Egyptian penal code grants courts wide discretionary power in regards to criminal matters
brought before them. Courts are allowed to use leniency when they believe necessary based
on the circumstances of the crime examined. Such leniency granted to judges by virtue of that
article empowers them to reduce penalties stipulated for felonies. The reduction of penalty is
done through the replacement of the penalty stipulated for felonies by another more lenient
penalty. The judge may replace the penalty stipulated with a more lenient punishment on the
condition that the penalty replaced is no lower than one or two instances in punishment.

C. Regulations and Scope of application:
The application of Article 17 of the penal code is not absolute. It is regulated in the manner
stipulated by the law. The conditions set for the application of Article 17 of the penal code
are that it applies:
a. To felonies;
b. Within the limits stipulated by law;
c. At the discretion of the judge.121
One of the general rules pertaining to the application of Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code
is that it is limited to felonies.122 It cannot be applied to misdemeanors and contraventions as
in light of the minimum punishments stipulated for them under the law there would be no
space to apply Article 17.
The application of Article 17 of the penal code on felonies is not absolute. It cannot be
applied to all felonies. This is due to the fact that some law provisions may stipulate the ban
or limit the application of that Article. The legislator has introduced some special legal
provisions which the general rules adopted within the penal codes cannot be applied to.
Accordingly the application of Article 17 as a general rule under the penal code should be
regarded in light of these special provisions. These special legal provisions are exceptional
provisions to which Article 17 as a general rule do not apply. The non-application of Article
17 can be wholly or partially. A public official who seeks or communicates with a foreign
country in a way that bounds to prejudice Egypt's warlike, diplomatic, political, or economic
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situation is deprived by virtue of law from the application of leniency in Article 17 of the
penal code.123 Special laws, as the law on combating drugs trafficking, may limit the
application of Article 17 of the penal code. Some articles of the code in combating drugs
trafficking stipulates that the courts may give their leniency to the perpetrators of the crimes,
however, they may not lessen their sanctions to less than six years of imprisonment.124
The second condition is that the application of article 17 of the penal code has to be within
the limit stipulated under the law. The legislator has conditioned the application of leniency
of judges within a certain range. Such range is framed by the law in granting the power to
judges to lessen the penalty stipulated for a certain felony one or two instances down.
According to the Article 17 of the penal code, the judges may replace a harsh felony penalty
with another more lenient penalty; in doing so, judges are obliged to stick to the range
stipulated under Article 17. Accordingly, judges, when they believe necessary, are entitled to
replace the penalty of execution with one instance less penalty like life imprisonment, or two
instances less penalty like temporal aggravated imprisonment.
The third condition is for the implementation of leniency which lies at the complete
discretion of judges. In terms of the reduction of sanctions, the legislator differentiates
between legal excuses and lenient judicial circumstances. The first, as in the case of an
adolescent accused under the age of 18, is named exclusively under the law, however, the
second, as in a case where the accused has exceeded the age of 18, 125 are left to the discretion
of the judge to decide what circumstances he considers as lenient judicial circumstances.
Accordingly, judges may not use analogy or exceed the legal excuses stipulated under the
law. Reduction of sanction, where stipulated, is placed on a judge to abide by and apply to the
case at hand.126
Unlike lenient judicial circumstances, judges at their discretion may reduce penalties. It is
believed that the legislator left lenient judicial circumstances without stipulation, as in legal
excuses, so judges apply leniency where they see necessary in all cases brought before them,
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especially unusual cases.127 It should be noted that legal excuses may change the nature of the
crime or the act committed according to the penalty applied; if detention is the penalty
applied thus it would be considered as misdemeanor and not felony. Nevertheless, when
lenient judicial treatment is applied, the nature of the crime is not changed according to the
penalty applied. Thus the crime would be still classified as a felony even though the penalty
applied is within the scope of penalties stipulated for misdemeanors.128

D. Additional conditions for the application of leniency:
Additional conditions for the application of a court’s leniency rests in the circumstances
related to the criminal him/herself. These condition are believed to be obvious conditions.
The first condition relates to the criminal record of the criminal. A criminal who deserves the
court’s leniency, from the point of view of the latter, has to be clean in terms of his criminal
record. A criminal whose criminal record reflects a criminal tendency should not benefit from
the leniency of judges. The competent court, when deciding on a case, needs to check the
criminal record of the perpetrator. If the latter’s criminal record reflects the commission of
other felonies of the same nature or magnitude. Thus, leniency should not be applied. A
criminal with a criminal record reflecting a serious criminal tendency should not benefit from
leniency. The logic is based on the fact that criminals with clean criminal records who
perpetrate a crime under the conditions judges deem entailing their leniency are assumed to
have perpetrated their crime with the contribution of such conditions, thus they apply their
leniency to this type of criminal with the hope that they may achieve the utmost purpose of
the legislator who seeks the punishment of perpetrators for the criminal act besides realizing
the policy of correction and reform. The policy implies punishing criminals for their criminal
act while at the same time aiming at the correction and the rehabilitation of such criminal.
Another condition which is classified under the judicial circumstances is provocation. The
Egyptian code does not recognize provocation as an exemption or an excuse which entails the
implementation of court’s leniency except in the case of a husband who surprises his wife
committing adultery with another stipulated under Article 237 of the penal code.
Nevertheless, provocation in some instances may be deemed as a factor for the reduction of
sanction. The competent court on their own may consider provocation as a lenient judicial
circumstance to which their leniency can be exercised.
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E. Authority of the Egyptian Court of Cassation:
Authority of the Egyptian Court of Cassation on the implementation of Article 17 of the
Egyptian penal code is limited. The rationale for that is based on several factors. The main
factors relates to the nature of function of the court of cassation. The legislative formula of
Article 17 of the penal code, per se, gives discretion to the competent court to apply leniency
when they see necessary. The first factor relates to the function of the court of cassation. The
Egyptian Criminal Procedures Code organizing the functions of the court of cassation under
Article 30 stipulates the following:
“Public prosecution, defendant or the responsible for the civil rights
have the right to appeal the final ruling in a felony or a misdemeanor
rendered before the court of cassation in the following instances:
1.
If the appealed ruling is based on contravention or
misapplication or interpretation of law,
2.
If an annulment hits the ruling,
3.
If any of the procedures were wrongfully carried affecting the
ruling.”129
According to the law, the functions of the court of cassation is limited to these stipulated
within the law of criminal procedures. Technically the court of cassation reviews the
application of laws ensuring that the laws and the procedures have been implemented in the
correct manner. In all cases, a court may not exceed or bypass these functions. One of the
direct consequences in relation to the application of Article 17 of the penal code, is that a plea
to apply the leniency of the judge cannot be brought, the first time, before the court of
cassation. Accordingly, the acceptance, by the court of cassation, to an appeal demanding for
the first time the application of Article 17 of the penal code exceeds the scope of functions
entitled to the court.130 Such a plea may be only submitted for the first time before the court
competent in examining the subject matter.
The second factor relates to the legislation empowering judges to use leniency when they see
necessary. The legislation formula under which Article 17 exists under the Egyptian penal
code forms a semi-umbrella which encompasses wide discretionary power granted at the
hand of the judge examining the subject matter. Such wide discretionary power can be tested
in several manners. One is that the circumstances of the crime is left to judges examining the
subject matter of the case in order to evaluate whether such circumstances entail the
implementation of their leniency or not. Being the competent court, it can freely decide what

129

Law No. 150 of 1950 (Criminal Procedure Code of 1950, reformed in 2008), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 22 May
1950, Article 30 (Egypt).
130
Appeal No. 1968/Judicial Year 48/Court of Cassation 29 Mar. 1979 (Egypt).

32

to consider as lenient judicial circumstances without being obliged to state in their reasoning
the nature of these circumstances or their influence on the crime or the act committed.
For instance, practically speaking, judges are not required to record in the court reasoning the
exact circumstances upon which they have based their leniency upon. The court of cassation
in its rulings recognizes that the reason behind the lenient judicial circumstances is left to the
internal feeling of the judge which cannot be explicitly expressed in his ruling reasoning
unlike other legal issues.131 A judge deciding on any felony, while rendering his judgment, is
not committed to listing all the circumstances he has relied on or what he sees as entailing the
application of his leniency. Thus he is not obliged to state in the court’s reasoning that he has
taken into consideration the difficult life and the abject poverty which a perpetrator may have
been suffering from by the time of committing his crime or even to state his belief that if such
circumstances were not present the latter would have not committed his crime, and that the
perpetrator has committed his crime out of dire need and poverty.
The issue of what the judge can consider as lenient judicial circumstances to which he applies
leniency reflects a very wide discretionary power. The court of cassation ruled that such
lenient judicial circumstances are not limited to the circumstances of the accused but also
includes the circumstances of the entire criminal incident encompassing all the factors related
to the rationale of the criminal act, the circumstances of the victim as well as the
perpetrator.132 This widens the scope of choice for judges to consider whatever circumstances
they see necessary to exercise their leniency.
Another which is closely related to the non-obligation of judges to state the circumstances
they relied upon while applying their leniency is that they only need to point out in their
reasoning that they applied Article 17 of the penal code. But once a judge has pointed out the
application of judgment he is compelled to lessen the verdict one or two instances in the
manner prescribed under the law. Accordingly, a judge who states in his reasoning that
leniency is applied but renders his judgment with the minimum penalty already stipulated for
the felony at hand, subjects his judgment to the court of cassation’s refutation on the basis of
misapplication of law. An example of misapplication of law is when a judge applies leniency
to a felony, and renders his verdict within the range of the minimum penalty stipulated for
such felony in the penal code.133
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Moreover, a judge who fails to state within his reasoning that he applied leniency to the case
at hand, though it can be assumed from the nature of the penalty rendered that leniency was
exercised, it would not be considered as misapplication of law by the court of cassation.
Multiple rulings of the latter stress that in case the competent court while rendering its
judgment, did not point out that it applied its leniency to the case at hand, and it is apparent
from the ruling that leniency was being implemented should not be grounds for an appeal
before the court of cassation. The decisive element in this case would be whether the
competent court rendered its reduced penalty within the limits stipulated under Article 17 of
the penal code or not. Therefore, a ruling as such would not be considered to be
misapplication of the law as long as it is rendered within the range of leniency stipulated
under the penal code.134
Added to the wide discretionary power of judges, in the case of multi-perpetrators, judges can
choose to apply their leniency to one or more of the perpetrators while depriving the others
from such leniency. Limiting the application of leniency to one accused among several others
is at the judge’s discretion. The reason for this is that circumstances differ from one crime to
another as well as from one accused to another. The status and circumstances of the
perpetrators are not the same and the judge is free to decide under which circumstances
leniency would be exercised and which not.135 Thus, the circumstances of one accused may
qualify for leniency in the judge’s opinion while the circumstances of the other accused do
not. Accordingly the former would benefit from the judge’s leniency while the latter is denied
such leniency.
It is obvious that the competent court enjoys wide discretionary power in regards to the
application of leniency to felonies. The court at its will, is free to apply leniency to whatever
felonies they consider appropriate and whomever committed such a criminal act. The main
constraint on such will is that the former has to abide within the range of punishments
stipulated under the law. Otherwise it is subject to the review of the court of cassation who
would refute the judgment based on the misapplication of law.
***
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Chapter IV
V. Examination of the appeals submitted before the court of cassation
involving the application of leniency
The literature available on the crimes of honor, as shown, assumes that the judiciary in Egypt
often adopts a certain tendency towards honor crimes forming a sort of protection from
prosecution for the perpetrators of honor crimes. The safe escape it provides lies in the
resorting of the judiciary to leniency. They believe that the judicial rulings usually resort to
leniency on cases of honor crimes for the perpetrators of the crime. This often takes place
when the perpetrators of the crimes are the victim’s paternal relatives. Furthermore leniency
may extend to perpetrators who do not fall within the prescribed reduction in sanction granted
under Article 237 of the penal code. If a husband fails to meet the conditions stipulated under
the latter article, the judiciary can still sentence him to a more lenient verdict. Lenient
sanctions mount to the same level sanction adopted under Article 237 of the penal code.
The literature suggests that leniency of the judiciary towards the perpetrators of honor crimes
is widely used. Scholars believe that whenever a crime of honor is brought before the
judiciary, the latter often applies leniency empowered to them by virtue of law. As explained
in chapter two, the bulk of the literature on honor crimes written in English share this
common assumption. The literature available ranges from admitting the difficulty of
providing an analysis due to the non-publication or non-availability of such cases at one end
to directly assuming that the leniency of judges provides a secure escape for the perpetrators
of honor crimes on the other end. Both points of views do not provide concrete analysis. They
mainly base their assumption on prior analysis of very few cases involving honor with a
direct focus to the use of leniency of judges in these cases. None of which give a wider focus
to the application of Article 17 of the penal code in general. The analysis this chapter
attempts to reflect a considerable extent in regards to the crimes that Egyptian judiciary tend
to apply leniency upon including honor crimes.
Some scholars acknowledge the problematic issue that the rulings of Egyptian courts
deciding on the subject matter remain unpublished.136 They continue to base their assumption
on the analysis of very few case rulings involving honor and develop their common
assumption and directly assume that the perpetrators of such type of crimes are granted an
136
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escape from the punishment which suits the severity of the crimes they commit. An attempt
which this chapter tends to overcome is the problem of unpublished court rulings rendered
from the courts deciding on the subject matter through an analysis of the appeals submitted
before the court of cassation involving the application of Article 17 of the penal code. In
contrary to the court rulings of the courts deciding on the subject matter, the appeals
submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation are often published and further used as
reference by legal scholars and practitioners. This paper acknowledges the fact that the
analysis of appeals submitted before the court of cassation are provisional, drawn from a
small number of appeals and does not provide a conclusive image for how Egyptian judiciary
treats honor crimes. However, one must not undermine the outcome of the analysis of these
appeals. Although the outcome of such analysis is provisional, nonetheless, it reflects to a
considerable extent of the realities of trial court practices by highlighting courts’ reasoning on
the cases appealed and involve the application of Article 17 of the penal code.
Accordingly, this chapter analyzes the actual appeals submitted before the Egyptian Court of
Cassation relating to the application of Article 17 of the penal code. The analysis, this chapter
presents, reveals to a considerable extent the way judges apply leniency to the crimes they are
ruling on. It reflects, in practice, how and when judges apply their leniency, what types of
crimes leniency is most applied to, what type of perpetrators benefit the most from the
leniency and whether judges necessarily apply their leniency to the perpetrators of honor
crimes at all.
The study provides an approximate view on which crimes the judiciary seems to be most
lenient towards. The need of framing such a picture is that most of the literature available
assumes the frequent leniency of judiciary towards the perpetrators of crimes involving
honor. It is obvious that the literature available on honor crimes as discussed previously in
details share the common ideology about the leniency empowered to the judiciary that
whenever crimes of honor are brought before the judiciary, the latter rules leniently to the
perpetrators of such type of crimes securing them an escape from the adequate punishment.
The literature available assumes the presence of a certain tendency of the judiciary to apply
their leniency to the perpetrators of crimes of honor.
This study is based on the compilation of number of appeals collected which were submitted
before the Egyptian Court of Cassation that dates from 1934 till 2014. The study examines
the court rulings relating to the application of Article 17 of the penal code that were reviewed
before the Egyptian Court of Cassation. The rulings examined under the study are the rulings
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from judicial year 4, 1934 to the judicial year 83, 2014. The examination deals with all the
cases in relation to the application of Article 17 which were submitted before the court of
cassation during that time. The rulings encompassed a wide range of crimes. The crimes
differed in nature, type and magnitude. They range among crimes relating to state,
individuals, public health, public officials and others.
An analysis based on the suggested study will focus on the appeals brought before the court
of cassation and involving the application of Article 17 of the penal code. From the
examination of such appeals, a statistical inference can be deduced by which one may draw a
considerable image to the realities of court trials and how judges tend to apply their leniency
to perpetrators of crimes. The analysis shows that there is a wide application of leniency
made by the Egyptian judiciary to various crimes brought before them. The first part of this
chapter presents the statistics regarding to the appeals submitted by the court of cassation
involving the application of leniency. The second part of the chapter takes a closer look at
cases involving honor to Article 17 of the penal code was whether invoked or applied.
Conclusion drawn from the rulings examined during these years show that honor crimes are
not decisively the most common crimes to which the leniency of the judiciary is applied. The
study compiles a huge number of crimes to which Article 17 is applied or has been invoked
and which were later appealed before the court of cassation. The classification of crimes is
based on the type of the wrongful act committed whether a misdemeanor or a felony. The
study classified crimes as ones relating to the state, occurring to individuals,
occurring/relating to the public officials, crimes relating to public wealth and other
miscellaneous crimes.

A. Statistical inference:
The table below reflects the outcome of the study on the crimes which were appealed under
or involving the application of Article 17 of the penal code before the court of cassation.
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Table 1: statistics of the appeals examined:
Crime

Number
Crimes relating to State

Drugs
414
Forgery
152
Illegal possession of weapons
54
Forgery and merchandizing of currency
12
Trafficking of monuments
4
Joining a terrorist group
4
Damaging Communication lines
2
Building without a license
1
Voluntary waste of official documents
1
Importing waste products
1
Total
645
Crimes occurring to individuals
Murder
256
Battery leading to permanent disability
79
Theft/robbery
62
Sexual laceration
48
Attempted Murder
39
Battery leading to death
34
Kidnapping
21
Honor Killings
9
Arson
10
Coerced signature
5
Attempted rape [statutory rape]
4
Coerced Abortion
4
Involuntary killing
1
Total
572
Crimes on Public Wealth
Embezzlement
110
Bribery
106
Seizure of state money
59
Tax evasion
16
voluntary undermining of state funds
5
Unjust earning
4
Breach of contract to which a state is a party
4
Transgression on state property
3
Illicit gain
2
Total
309
Crimes occurring/relating to Public Officials
Assaulting a public official
11
Torturing inmates
5
Arbitrary Arrest
4
Resisting authorities
1
Total
21
Others
Slaughtering female stock
2
Cheque without provision cover
1
Slaughtering outside slaughter house
1
38

Total
Sub Total

4
1551

The above statistics on the appeals examined which were appealed under or involving the
application of Article 17 before the court of cassation, during the specified time, show that
leniency of judiciary is widely applied. Such leniency is applied to various type of crimes.
Crimes varied between crimes occurring to State, public officials, individuals, public wealth
and other miscellaneous crimes as classified under the table above.
Crimes occurring to state, the examined rulings before the court of cassation shows that drugs
related crimes are the most common crimes to which Article 17 is applied. Drugs related
crimes vary between the illicit possession, smuggling and addiction of drugs. The judiciary
seems to be lenient towards such type of crimes according to that study. Following drugs,
forgery and illegal possession of weapons are also treated in a lenient manner. The leniency
of judiciary is also applied widely to include crimes related to forgery, illegal possession of
weapons, forgery and merchandizing of currency, trafficking of monuments, etc. These
crimes seem to take part of the judiciary’s leniency as well at the latter’s discretion.
Crimes occurring to individuals come in the second place in the lenient treatment of judiciary
following crimes to the state. Competent courts often resort to the application of leniency to
crimes occurring to individuals. Murder crimes come on top of the crimes occurring to
individuals which leniency applies to. Article 17 of the penal code is widely applied to
murder crimes by the competent courts. The high number of murder crimes to which leniency
is applied may reflect a general tendency by the judiciary to be lenient to murder crimes as
with any other crime.
In applying their leniency to murder crimes the judiciary varies according to the
circumstances of each crime. Sometimes leniency is applied to reduce sanctions one degree in
some of these crimes and two degrees in others. In some murder crimes, capital punishment
was replaced with the penalty of life imprisonment while in others capital punishment was
replaced to an aggravated imprisonment.
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B. Honor Killing and Killings not involving honor:
Table 2: Honor Killings involving the application of leniency:

The examination shows that around 265 murder crimes involved the application of Article 17
before the court of cassation. The diagram shows that out of 265 murder crimes to which
leniency was appealed or applied, only 9 murders were honor killings while the other 256
murders did not involve honorary issues. In terms of percentage the study shows that only 3
% of the murder crimes which were appealed under or involving the application of Article 17
are honor related crimes, while the other 97 % are the usual murder crimes which vary
according to each crime. Based on these statistics, the judiciary seems to be lenient in general
to most of the crimes brought before them regardless of whether they relate or involve honor
as shown on the diagram above.
Regarding public wealth crimes, the examination shows that leniency is applied to a large
number of this type of crimes. The crimes which are the most common are embezzlement,
bribery, seizure of state money and tax evasion.
The leniency of the judiciary is also present in the crimes occurring or relating to public
officials. Crimes occurring/relating to the public officials to which leniency is applied the
most often are assaulting a public official, torturing inmates and arbitrary arrest.
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Leniency can be also found under the appeals of other miscellaneous crimes as shown in the
table. The miscellaneous crimes to which leniency is applied has no specific norm. They can
encompass crimes as slaughtering female stock or passing cheques with no sufficient funds.

C. A closer look to the honor killings reviewed before the court of cassation:
Having a closer look at the crimes involving honor submitted before the court of cassation
under appeal or involving the application of leniency, one may find appeals which assumes
that the leniency of the judiciary is not necessarily applied to crimes involving honor
whenever they are brought before the latter courts. The reasoning of the court of cassation on
the appeals of these cases makes it somehow clear that to a considerable extent to how the
application of leniency is implemented in realities of court trials.
Case # 1:
An appeal examined before the court of cassation on December 21, 1948 in which a husband
killed his wife for getting pregnant from incest.137
The court of the subject matter applied leniency to the accused.138 The latter appealed the
sentence rendered before the court of cassation on the ground of misapplication of law and
pleaded the application of Article 237 of the penal code.
The court of cassation rejected the appeal reasoning its rejection on the fact the defendant
killed his wife after he knew that she got pregnant from incest. The court stated that analogy
cannot be made to legal exceptions as the one stipulated under Article 237 of the penal code,
thus the defendant cannot benefit from the application of such article.
Case # 2:
The appeal examined dates to April 20, 1954 where a man who deliberately killed his female
family member in the governorate of Qena, Upper Egypt Region.139 He admitted killing her
as he knew that she had gotten pregnant through incest. The man accompanied the victim to a
remote area where he beats her to death with a heavy stick. The man admitted committing
this crime as citing defending the honor of the family. He was prosecuted under Article 234/1
137
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of the penal code which stipulates that whoever intentionally kills a person without
premeditation shall be sanctioned with life or hard labor imprisonment.140 The pregnancy of
the victim was confirmed by the forensic medical report.
The court examining the subject matter sentenced the man to ten years of hard labor
imprisonment. The latter appealed to the court of cassation on the basis of bad reasoning and
the request of application of Article 17 of the penal code. The court of cassation rejected the
accused’s appeal. It based its refusal on the fact that intent could be deduced from the
numerous severe hits which the accused directed to the victim’s head and body causing her
death. This was according to the autopsy’s report carried out by the forensic examiners. The
court also rejected the accused’s appeal based on the lack of response of the subject matter
court to the accused’s request to have applied Article 17 of the penal code. The competent
court is not obliged to reply to such requests. The appeal was considered by the court of
cassation to be of no solid basis and thus rejected the content of the appeal.
Case # 3:
An appeal submitted before the Court of Cassation dating back to November 1, 1976 in
which a defendant, in Upper Egypt, deliberately killed both his wife and mother in law for
their bad reputation and sexual misconduct.141 The defendant confessed before the
prosecution that after he returned from his travel he heard of his wife’s bad reputation and
sexual misconduct. He admitted killing both his wife and mother in law as after a fight they
had about this issue. He got prosecuted under Article 234 of the penal code.
The court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to 7 years of an aggravated
prison. The court applied Article 17 of the penal code to the accused. The accused appealed
the sentence on the ground of misapplication of law and bad reasoning. The appellant stated
that the confession before the court was not detailed and is not sufficient to sentence him to
the rendered punishment. He pleaded the application of Article 237 of the penal code instead
of Article 234.
The court of cassation rejected the appeal reasoning its rejection on the fact that the defendant
admitted before both the prosecution and the court that he intentionally killed both his wife
and mother in law as they informed him that they are free to do whatever they want which got
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him provoked and thus killing them. The court stated that Article 237 of the penal code was
inapplicable to the case of the appellant.
Case # 4:
An appeal was examined before Cairo Court of Cassation on February 14, 1977 in which the
defendant deliberately killed the deceased for the sake of honor.142 The first defendant killed
the deceased using a chopper and threw his victim in the river with the aid of the other
defendant. The other defendant only aided the other defendant in throwing away the body of
the deceased. The prosecution prosecuted both defendants under Article 234 of the penal
code.
The court of the subject matter sentenced the first defendant to 7 years of an aggravated
prison while the other defendant was sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment. The court applied
Article 17 to both defendants. The first defendant appealed the rendered sentence on the
ground of nullity of procedures. The defendant appealed that before the first court both
defendants had the same lawyer which constituted a conflict of interest as the first defended
was accused of intended murder while the other was accused of hiding the body of the
deceased.
The court of cassation considered the appeal admissible based on the conflict of interest
existed before the court of the subject matter that both defendants had the same lawyer. The
court appealed the sentence and returned it to a different court to re-examine the case.143
Case # 5:
An appeal examined before the court of cassation on March 13, 1977, in which a husband
deliberately killed his wife after becoming suspicious about her sexual conduct.144 The man
was prosecuted for intentionally killing the victim with a knife. He got her alone in their
bedroom and stabbed her several stabs intending to kill her. The autopsy report emphasized
that these stabs was the direct cause of her death. The prosecution prosecuted the accused
under Article 234/1 of the penal code.
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The Giza Felonies Court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to 15 years of
an aggravated imprisonment according to the penalty empowered to it under Article 234/1 of
the penal code. The accused appealed the court’s ruling before the court of cassation based on
several grounds. Mainly poor reasoning and misapplication of law. Firstly, he questioned the
former court’s decision regarding premeditation. The appellant argued that the court was not
determined whether the killing was intentional or not. Secondly, he pleaded that the court
deciding on the subject matter tackled the motivation or the reason behind the commitment of
the crime while the motivation of the crime is not an element of the crime. Thirdly, the court
reasoned the presence of intent because the accused used a sharp instrument in his crime and
stabbed the victim several times causing her death. In reality, the accused should be tried for
battery leading to death and had to be tried according to Article 237 of the penal code.
Fourthly, the defense pleaded that sanctioning the accused left his children with no one to
depend and entailed the competent court’s leniency and its application of Article 17 of the
penal code.
The court of cassation responded to the defense’s first appeal. The court stated that there was
no hesitation at the competent court’s side about whether the crime was premeditated or not.
The court of cassation reasoned the non-existence of such premeditation as the appellant had
ongoing disputes with the victim, and in their last dispute she was killed. The court also
acknowledged that the appellant did not specially prepare the knife used for his crime as it
was already there in their domicile’s kitchen. As for the second pleading that the competent
court considered the motivation and the reason behind the crime while they do not constitute
an element of the crime, the court of cassation replied that the court of the subject matter did
tackle the motivation and the reasons behind the crime committed, but did not rely on them in
their rulings. While the court found the intent of killing ambiguous, they believed that the
presence of such intent is based on the fact that the weapon used was a lethal weapon; knife.
Moreover the severity of the stabs which the appellant directed to his victim till the latter
passed away makes the presence of the intent of killing undebatable. Added to that, the court
of cassation’s response to the request for the court’s leniency, is at the court’s sole discretion
with no review of the reasons behind applying such leniency is necessary.
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Case # 6:
The case dates back to March 4, 1987. The case is of a husband who deliberately killed his
wife for her bad sexual reputation and misconduct.145 He admitted before the prosecution that
they fought over her sexual misconduct and bad reputation. He stabbed her several times
using a penknife immediately when she confessed the name of her lover and he did not stop
till she has fallen dead on the ground. The prosecution prosecuted the accused under Article
234/1.
The Cairo Felonies Court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to ten years of
prison. The court applied Article 17 of the penal code to the accused. The accused appealed
the court’s ruling before the court of cassation based on several grounds. He appealed based
on poor reasoning, misapplication of law and prejudice to the right of defense. He pleaded his
loss of awareness as he was treated of severe depression by the time he committed his crime.
He followed that it was clear to the court deciding on the subject matter when it asked the
accused about the crime, the latter cried and muttered incomprehensible words. Thus the
court should have resorted to expertise to decide on his mental awareness. He also pleaded
the absence of the intent of killing as it is obvious that a fight has taken place between him
and the victim right before the crime.
The court of cassation rejected the defendant’s appeal and reasoned its rejection on several
grounds. First, the accused admitted his crime in details before the prosecution as he
confessed killing his wife as they fought about her sexual misconduct and bad reputation on
the spot she uttered the name of her lover. The court emphasized on the presence of the intent
of killing as the accused stabbed his victim using the penknife several times and did not stop
till she was completely dead leaving her on the ground. The appeal was considered by the
court of cassation to be of no solid basis and thus rejected the content of the appeal.
Case # 7:
The case dates back to March 10, 1997 as a husband suffering from impotence deliberately
killed his wife for being suspicious about her sexual conduct.146 He admitted before the
prosecution that he killed his wife as he doubted that she is engaged in a sexual affair. The
accused confessed that he fought with the victim and choked her to death using a piece of
145
146

Appeal No. 6243/Judicial Year 56/Court of Cassation (Egypt).
Appeal No. 24855/Judicial Year 64/Court of Cassation (Egypt).

45

cloth. He admitted that the victim used to mention his sexual disability whenever they fight
but he could not bear the insult on their last fight and he killed her. The accused further
admitted that he killed his daughter as he doubted her blood relationship. The prosecution got
him prosecuted under Article 234 of the penal code.
The court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to life time imprisonment.
The court applied replaced the capital punishment by the sentence rendered by applying
Article 17 of the penal code to the accused. The accused appealed the sentence based on the
grounds of misapplication of law and bad reasoning. He pleaded the misapplication of law on
the basis that the court should have applied Article 237 of the penal code instead of Article
234. He emphasized that he killed his wife as she was in a state of adultery.
The court of cassation rejected the appeal. The court reasoned that it was not proved that the
wife was caught committing adultery as the perpetrator confessed before the prosecution in
details that he killed his victim as the latter mentioned his sexual disability during their last
fight, thus, he brought a piece of cloth and choked her to death. The accused admitted that he
also killed his daughter as he doubted her blood bond. The court further reasoned that the
accused came back home and doubted the presence of a stranger in house and as he faced the
deceased with his doubts, she mocked his sexual disability which got him provoked and
killed her on the spot without being certain of the presence of someone or even without
tracing any. The court of cassation rejected the appeal as it is of no solid ground and the nonapplicability of Article 237 of the penal code.
Case # 8:
An Appeal dating to October 21, 1997 in which two brothers deliberately killed the wife of
their third brother.147 The defendants admitted before the court that they killed the deceased
for her bad sexual conduct and reputation. They entered the deceased’s house after the
departure of the latter’s husband. They threw her on the ground and choked her to death, then
they burnt her after making sure she was no longer breathing. They confessed that their crime
was meant to clean their honor from the disgrace the deceased brought to their family. The
prosecution prosecuted the defendants under Articles 230, 231 and 234 of the penal code.148
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The court examining the subject matter sentenced the defendants to life imprisonment. The
court replaced the capital punishment with the rendered punishment by applying Article 17 of
the penal code. The defendants appealed the ruling based on the ground of bad reasoning.
They appealed that their confession was rendered under duress. They emphasized that their
confession before the court was not in details.
The court of cassation reasoned its rejection to the appeal of the defendants based on that
although their confession before the court was not in details, however, they admitted and
simulated their crime before the prosecution. The court of cassation rejected the appeal as it is
of no solid ground.
Case # 9:
An appeal examined before the court of cassation on March 11, 2001 in which a brother
deliberately killed his sister for getting pregnant from incest. 149 The accused drugged the
deceased by convincing the latter that those medical tablets helps her to get rid of the fetus.
After she lost conscious he choked her to death with a wet piece of cloth. The prosecution
prosecuted the accused under Articles 230 and 231 of the penal code.
The court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to ten years of an aggravated
prison. The court replaced the sentence of capital punishment by the rendered sentence by
applying Article 17 of the penal code. The defendant appealed the sentence based on the
ground of bad reasoning. He appealed that the autopsy report did not state explicitly that the
assault of the defendant is the direct cause of death.
The court of cassation rejected the defendant’s appeal. It based its reasoning on the fact that
the defendant intentionally provided the deceased with some medical tablets and he waited
till she fainted and then he choked her to death. The court stated that the autopsy report stated
that the deceased’s stomach contained drugs. The court cleared that it has no doubt that the
assault on the deceased by the defendant was the cause of the former’s death, in addition to
the defendant’s confession before the prosecution.
From both the cases summarized above, one may not draw a decisive conclusion on whether
the tendency of judges has changed over time towards honor crimes or not. First, it should be
noted that none of the appeals summarized indicated that the application of leniency to the
149
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perpetrators was based on the fact that these cases involved honorary issues. One can only
recognize that these appeals involve honor from the facts of each case. The reason behind this
is that nothing oblige courts deciding on the subject matter to state the reasoning upon which
they implemented Article 17 of the penal code. The only thing which matters is that judges
merely refer to the fact that they applied leniency to the perpetrators of the crime. 150 Second,
from the analysis of the appeals examined, one may find that judiciary has widely applied
Article 17 of the penal code not only murder cases but also to illegal possession of drugs,
illicit weapons and several other crimes. In addition to that, among the appeals examined
which involve honor there was found couple of cases to which the leniency was not applied
to the perpetrators of such type of crimes may be taken as an assumption that some crimes
involving honor do not enjoy leniency of judges. Accordingly, one may not conclusively
assert that the judiciary adopts a certain lenient tendency towards crimes involving honor in
specific.
Leniency is applied in a broad manner when the judiciary sees fit regardless of the type of
crime brought before it. The assumption adopted by most of the literature supposes that the
Egyptian judiciary are necessarily lenient to these types of crimes. However, in light of the
analysis conducted another assumption may rise which tells that the courts often applies to a
wide range of crimes they believe in entailing the application of the leniency in Article 17 of
the penal code according to the circumstances of each crime.
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VI.

Conclusion:

Most scholars assume that Egypt fully accommodates honor crimes in the penal code through
both Articles 17 and 237. Scholars presupposes that Article 17 of the penal code guarantees
the perpetrators of honor crimes, who do not fall under the scope of reduction in sanction
embodied in Article 237 of the code, less serious prosecutions. They propose that it is not
only husbands who benefit from the reduction in sanction stipulated under Article 237 but
male paternal relatives often benefit from a reduction similar as well. The examination of the
appeals involving the application of Article 17 of the penal code which are submitted before
the Egyptian Court of Cassation presupposes that another assumption which provisionally
reflects an image to the extent of the application of leniency by courts is too wide by which it
would be hard to conclusively assume that the Egyptian judiciary adopts a lenient tendency
towards honor crimes. The realities of court trials revealed by the analysis provided assumes
that leniency of courts is applied in a broad manner often well beyond the crimes of honor.
Courts gives leniency to a wide range of crimes which often includes murders for reasons
apart from honor, illicit possession of drugs, bribery and several others. The leniency in
Article 17 of the penal code is not necessarily a complementary article to Article 237 of the
penal code which guarantees the perpetrators of honor of crimes less serious prosecution.
***
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